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ABSTRACT
This article criticises the growing reliance on environmental and
social (ES) policies by development finance institutions (DFIs), and
the increasing use of corresponding accountability mechanisms
to challenge development projects. The concept of juridification is
used to explain this phenomenon and shows the crucial role of
global civil society in expanding the reach of ES policies and
accountability mechanisms. Linked to the competition between
DFIs in the “marketplace” of international development finance,
juridification also enables legal avoidance practices by the DFIs.
The article shows that juridification in international development
finance is “tragic” because the expansion of ES policies further
marginalises the affected groups needing legal protection.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article critique le recours croissant des institutions de
financement du développement (IFD) à des politiques
environnementales et sociales, ainsi que leur recours à des
mécanismes d’imputabilité pour remettre en cause les projets de
développement. Le concept de juridification explique ce
phénomène et révèle le rôle crucial joué par la société civile
mondiale dans l’élargissement de la portée des politiques
environnementales et sociales et des mécanismes d’imputabilité.
La juridification est liée à la compétition entre les IFDs sur le
marché de la finance internationale du développement. Elle
facilite également le recours des IFDs à des pratiques d’évitement
légal. Cet article démontre que la juridification est “tragique”
pour le développement international, parce que l’expansion des
politiques environnementales et sociales amplifie la
marginalisation des groupes touchés qui nécessitent une
protection légale.
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For decades after the Second World War, international development cooperation was
driven by perceived differences in global standards of living and motivated by lofty
goals, such as poverty reduction. Since the beginning of the 1990s, this narrative
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started changing. More and more institutions, donors and borrowing states, started
adopting the language of compliance with standards contained in international instru-
ments adopted by international organisations, such as the World Bank or the Inter-
national Labour Organization.1 As part of this process, development finance
institutions (DFIs) established internal environmental and social (ES) standards along
with corresponding accountability mechanisms.2 Today most DFI-funded development
projects must adhere to a range of complex international normative frameworks on
issues such as the environment, human rights, as well as trade and investment. These fra-
meworks define what development initiatives are acceptable, their successes and failures,
and how the exercise of power in this field can be scrutinised.
We argue that this process is an example of “increased density of law” (Habermas
1985, 357) and that the growing use of legalistic mechanisms to resolve political
conflict resulting from international interventions can be understood as juridification.
While there are many legal frameworks that govern international development, this
article focuses on the rise of DFIs’ internal ES policies, coupled with their corresponding
project accountability mechanisms. We explain key drivers for this shift, as well as its con-
sequences, by focusing on the interaction of three concepts borrowed from sociology (“jur-
idification”), political economy (“marketplace”), and law (“legal avoidance”). Overall, our
aim is to provide a systemic critique of factors driving the rise in compliance-based govern-
ance in international development finance, and in doing so, to challenge and complement
other explanatory accounts that shed light on the same phenomenon.
Our analysis highlights an overlooked fact that juridification is habitually promoted by
prominent NGOs, and some smaller grassroots organisations working directly with
affected people. For this article, we term these juridification-promoting organisations
“global civil society”.3 On the “receiving end” of this demand for more ES standards
and greater accountability, is the institutional system of development finance which,
we argue, is characterised by the competition amongst the DFIs for primacy, access to
funds and institutional survival. The interaction between these two groups of actors –
global civil society and DFIs – is key in shaping the internal normative frameworks
that govern development finance.
Against this background, we use the metaphor of a tragedy (Christodoulidis 2015) to
frame the core themes of our article along three lines. Firstly, in a break with recent con-
tributions on legalisation in international relations (Abbott et al. 2000), and transform-
ations in international institutions (e.g. Sinclair 2017), we focus on global civil society as a
protagonist, striving to invoke the counter-hegemonic potential of rules-based govern-
ance against the imposition of top-down visions of development (de Sousa Santos and
Rodríguez-Garavito 2005, 10). Through theoretical insights on juridification, we show
how global civil society, in resisting development-induced commodification of social
relations, often demands for more enhanced rules and processes, and thus more account-
ability of DFIs. Generally, global civil society tends to believe that juridified development
is better than development based on the contractual model of bargaining between power-
ful actors such as states, investors and DFIs. This belief in the positive impacts of juridifi-
cation renders our protagonist a “tragic” one, that is, incapable of recognising the crucial
role she plays in perpetuating the negative consequences of juridification.
The second tragic aspect is that, due to the growth of funding sources, and especially
the expanding role of private actors (Cotula and Tan 2018), the system of international
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development finance increasingly relies on the self-referential logic of economic bargain-
ing and efficiency. We argue that this engenders the dynamics of a “marketplace”. As a
consequence, DFIs tend to evolve their internal policies to entice powerful stakeholders,
while adopting sophisticated strategies of legal avoidance to quell the efficacy of the ES
policy adopted. This dynamic channels juridification demands made by global civil
society into rules internal to DFIs, which are largely procedural and usually unable to
offer an effective scrutiny of institutional decision-making. Accordingly, we show that
legal avoidance can result in serious unintended consequences. Instead of promoting
rule-based governance in development finance, juridification and subsequent legal avoid-
ance may reduce spaces for peaceful political contestation, and further entrench institu-
tionalised practices that favour the interests of global and national elites, rather than the
needs of the communities in which development projects take place. This is the second
tragedy of juridification in international development: these dynamics ultimately disem-
power the groups affected by development projects, whom global civil society is allegedly
trying to support and protect.
Finally, the third element of the tragedy unveiled by our article concerns the
limited field of vision of the main character, global civil society. The tragic conse-
quences of its decisions are only visible to the audience overseeing the play (Chris-
todoulidis 2015).4 In the final section we adopt the third person perspective, which
takes into account the dynamic of the marketplace, to identify more promising ways
of triggering the counter-hegemonic potential of law than relying on the self-refer-
ential logic of DFIs’ internal accountability. In doing so, we also challenge the
idea that further internal juridification of the DFIs is “better than nothing”, and
that despite all its flaws, juridification remains a step in the right direction
towards a better and more accountable development governance, as many scholars
and NGOs suggest (Hunter 2003; Fourie 2009). While we acknowledge that ES stan-
dards create some advantages to some communities in a short term, we urge to take
seriously the negative impacts of this process in the long run and at a systemic level.
Ultimately, this calls global civil society to rethink its engagement with some of the
“solutions” currently available to marginalised communities affected by development
interventions.
Juridification in international development finance
Juridification through ES standards and accountability mechanisms
Generally, ES policies of DFIs set out rules and processes that govern development pro-
jects. These policies are usually binding on the staff of each DFI, and they can also exert
normative effects on the borrower entities due to their conditional nature (Dann and
Riegner 2019). Groups negatively affected by development projects arising from
alleged breaches of ES standards by the DFI’s staff can under certain conditions resort
to DFIs’ accountability mechanisms, which generally lead to an internal review of the
project. Not all accountability mechanisms are based on a compliance review against
specific regulatory standards. For instance, the International Finance Corporation’s
(IFC) Compliance Advisory Ombudsman also operates according to more discretionary
alternative dispute resolution processes (IFC 2013).
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Global and regional with strong international presence
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and International
Development Association (the World Bank)
Y Inspection Panel 1993 Y




International Finance Corporation (IFC) Y Compliance Advisory
Ombudsman
1998 Y
Asian Development Bank (ADB) Y Accountability Mechanism 2003 Y
African Development Bank Y Independent Review
Mechanism
2004 Y
European Investment Bank Y Complaints Mechanism;
European Ombudsman
2008(b) Y





Green Climate Fund Y Independent Redress
Mechanism
2014 Y
New Development Bank Y Compliance procedure n/a N









Black Sea Trade and Development Y Independent Accountability
Mechanism
2009 Y




Development Bank of Latin America N n/a n/a
Central American Bank for Economic
Integration




East African Development Bank N n/a n/a
Islamic Development Bank N n/a n/a
Pacific Islands Development Bank N n/a n/a
West African Development Bank Y Policy and Grievance
procedure
n/a N
Trade and Development Bank of Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Y Grievance procedure n/a N
Eurasian Development Bank N n/a n/a
National
Japan International Cooperation Agency and
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Y Examiners for the
Environmental Guidelines
2003 Y






Department for International Development
(UK)
N Complaints procedure n/a N
USAID Y Administrative Grievance
Procedure
n/a N
Sources: official websites of each institution.
(a) Intended as a separate specialist organ (with its own institutional structure or composed of independent experts). This
organ functions outside the general administrative processes within an institution in order to ensure its relative inde-
pendence.
(b) The date of signing MoU between the EIB and European Ombudsman aimed to “improve stakeholder protection” in
the activities of the EIB.
(c) A joint mechanism of FMO (Netherlands) and Proparco (France)
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Table 1 is a non-exhaustive list of DFIs for which we ascertain the existence of ES pol-
icies, accountability mechanisms and their position within the structure of each
institution.
Whilst not all institutions have adopted ES policies, the newest and more sizeable
DFIs, such as the New Development Bank, the Green Climate Fund and the AIIB
have all enacted some form of ES framework. This suggests that ES standards and
accountability mechanisms are becoming ubiquitous in development finance and con-
tinue to gain significance among established as well as new DFIs.
Arguably, the growth of ES rules and forums for submitting individual complaints
does not mean that the system of development finance is becoming more accountable.
Instead, our analysis suggests that it creates a resemblance of accountability. Its reliance
on the “rules-plus-enforcement” structure, typical of western domestic legal systems
appears to promote the attainment of better decisions, more order, and fairer conse-
quences for people affected by development projects. However, because accountability
mechanisms lack appropriate institutional checks and balances (Jokubauskaite 2019),
or adequate representation at the level of rule-making (Houghton 2019), the system
mimics the process of juridification in domestic legal systems, but fails to replicate key
elements of their legitimacy, such as democratic deliberation, access to remedy or due
process. Thus, it begs further explanation why global civil society continues to
promote the idea of institutional accountability through ES policies and mechanisms.
The literature on international development has thus far paid little attention to theor-
etical frameworks that might explain such a trend. One can identify studies on specific
actors, such as NGOs (Wenar 2006) or DFIs (Buntaine 2015; Park 2015; Balaton-
Chrimes and Haines 2015) and on the legal nature of specific ES policies and account-
ability mechanisms (Fourie 2009; Jokubauskaite 2018). Some theorists of international
relations recognise a link between accountability and enhanced legitimacy of inter-
national institutions (Buchanan and Keohane 2006), while some legal theorists argue
these institutionalised forms of accountability represent emerging global administrative
law (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2004, 34), or instances of informal international law-
making (Berman 2012). The concept of juridification that we adopt here enables a deeper
and more comprehensive understanding of what drives these normative frameworks, as
it examines the dynamics occurring between different social actors operating in the
system of international development.
Juridification was first introduced in sociology by “systems theory” scholars who pro-
posed that legal systems and organisations are “self-referential” and that law, being a
unique and “autopoietic” social system, can expand into other social domains according
to its own communicative code (Luhmann 2004, 79–84). While ES policies are not “law”
in a formal doctrinal sense, and accountability mechanisms do not represent a form of
“judicialisation” as theorised by some scholars (Fourie 2009), they nonetheless share
the binary “legal/illegal” code that characterises legal systems. ES frameworks, with
their focus on compliance, aim at verifying whether a given authoritative behaviour is
“in-or-out” of established institutional requirements – which therefore justifies using
the analytical framework of juridification in this instance.5 We suggest that this approach
offers a helpful explanation for the mushrooming of ES policies and mechanisms and
their expansion in terms of reach and significance, and the way these frameworks now
operate at the systemic level.
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Furthermore, the concept of juridification captures the tendency to perceive social
relationships between the self and others according to legal paradigms of subjectivity,
capacity, and action (Blichner and Molander 2008, 47). In this approach, individuals
and groups develop self-perceptions as addressees of certain rules, and/or persons with
certain entitlements. Thus, for example, demands by groups negatively affected by
DFI-funded development can be framed as entitlements emanating from social and/or
environmental obligations. However, these entitlements and the subjectivity of affected
groups now become accorded to them through DFI ES policies, rather than simply by
virtue of them being human, or exposed to an arbitrary exercise of power, or having
suffered harm. Here, our focus on juridification exposes the juridical and institutional
framing that transforms affected people into, simultaneously, subjects with limited enti-
tlements, and also objects governed by the rules of international development finance.
Juridification as “welfare interventionism”
Going back to the origins of the concept of juridification, Teubner (1998) and Habermas
(1985) focused on the phenomenon of “legal expansion”, noting that juridification makes
not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative change. Teubner called this phenomenon
“regulatory law”; with national labour and social protection laws seen as prime examples
of this process. Regulatory law signifies a transition from formal to “material” modes of
law (Teubner 1998, 397).6 Because of this shift, formal law (mainly based on contracts as
means of exchange) is increasingly replaced with legal patterns of material entitlements
for certain social groups (e.g. ES standards that set entitlements for indigenous people in
project finance). Accordingly, while juridification can result in a quantitative prolifer-
ation of norms and institutions, it also leads to more welfare-oriented standards, even
when the overall number of formal rules remains similar, thereby slowly transforming
the core quality of law. In this way, law assumes a more interventionist role in society,
under the demands by social forces (Teubner 1998).
Polanyi also explained the social quest for welfare laws and interventionist mechan-
isms. He suggested that, as labour, land and money are turned into fictitious commod-
ities (Polanyi 1957, 71–81), society is pushed towards greater reliance on self-regulating
markets, which in turn become increasingly “disembedded” from their social foun-
dations. Thus, the destabilisation of societies where these markets are situated sets the
ground for the counter-movement from people who physically experience the outcomes
of the disembedded market in their daily lives, such as peasants, workers and the landless.
This counter-movement demands for greater embedment of the market, to render it less
disruptive of the social relationships and structures. Hence, according to Polanyi, society
and market constantly fluctuate between commodification and embeddedness (“double
movement”); between the fiction of a free, self-regulating market, and a rebound of
the social reality where the market operates (Cotula 2013). Some rules foster the realis-
ation of markets, whilst others attempt to connect them back to the social realities. Argu-
ably, ES policies and accountability mechanisms in international development are
expected to do the latter.
Polanyi’s “double movement” is a metaphor that unveils some key characteristics of
juridification in the DFIs. It explains a persistence of global civil society to have more
welfare-oriented rules, especially in the areas of transparency, participation, indigenous
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peoples’ rights, and social and environmental protection more generally. Empirical
research has shown that all the landmark ES policies, accountability mechanisms and
other relevant “interventionist” policies were first and foremost pushed and demanded
by the civil society (Cernea 2005; Van Putten 2008). There is, then, a relationship
between the aggressive push for the neoliberal agenda by the DFIs, which dis-embeds
the market or “delegalizes” the regulatory sphere (Teubner 1998, 398–399), and the sub-
sequent reaction by civil society in demanding more rules, accountability and, thus, social
embeddedness of the market.
The “dark side” of juridification
Claiming that juridification is caused solely by the movement of counter-hegemony is,
however, reductive. The critical literature also identifies various benefits of juridification
to power holders.
For instance, juridification can be a strategy of evading responsibility, by passing it
“down the ladder”, away from the organs that make the rules and strategic decisions
in the first place (Haines and Sutton 2003). With an increased use of accountability
mechanisms, fundamental problems stemming from general development strategies
can be attributed to the non-compliance with ES policies, and the failure by mid-level
management to observe the multiple rules applicable in this set-up. This diverts attention
and resistance efforts away from the scrutiny of high-level policies and officials, towards
everyday operational decision-making. For instance, Shihata (2000, 1–3), a key propo-
nent of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, noted that a rationale for its establishment
was to ensure the efficient management and control over staff. Indeed, mid-level manage-
ment’s involvement in the Inspection Panel process is akin to a respondent in a legal
dispute, with the President and members of the World Bank Board of Directors
having discretion to assess, ignore or influence the outcomes of any accountability
process. Thus, they themselves are not held to account for their role in spearheading a
given development programme, or approving funding for a specific project.7
Juridification also comes with a growing institutional discretion to monitor, oversee,
and trigger changes in existing social structures.8 For instance, in its ES framework the
World Bank has included the long-advocated requirement of a free, prior and informed
consent from Indigenous communities (potentially) affected by development projects
(World Bank 2017). But in doing so, it has also expanded its discretion to monitor,
assess, and ultimately influence the decision-making processes within the affected Indi-
genous communities.9 In the following section we discuss other benefits of juridification
to decision-makers such as the enhanced legitimacy for DFIs that comes as part and
parcel of adopting “state of the art” ES frameworks, which in turn enable DFIs to
survive, compete and gain primacy in the marketplace.
A critical question here is whether juridification is a one-way, irreversible process
(Teubner 1998, 398–399), or whether it can be tamed or even inverted by the power
holders, as Blincher and Molander (2008, 49) suggest. This question matters because,
if juridification can be stopped or reversed (Kouroutakis and Ranchordas 2016), then
it may be possible for DFIs to develop normative frameworks that halt juridification
however, if one accepts Polanyi’s insight that the self-regulating market can never mate-
rialise, then, as long as DFIs advance a neoliberal development agenda, there will be a
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quest for welfare interventionism and thus demands for new rules to counteract the
impact of market forces on ecosystems and communities. Moreover, DFIs will be keen
to respond to these demands in order to expand their authority, so as to avoid other auth-
orities, such as governments and courts, from appropriating this space.
Juridification, therefore, cannot be stopped, but only “tamed” by hegemonic actors
through sophisticated techniques such as legal avoidance. McBarnet (1988, 114)
defined legal avoidance as a socio-legal phenomenon whereby the subjects to regulation
“create strategies weakening the law by legally avoiding it”. In development context, DFIs
and their accountability mechanisms adopt such techniques, which diminish the
counter-hegemonic potential of the rules they enact (Cabrera and Ebert 2019). To put
it in Teubner’s terminology, we observe a range of strategies by DFIs that channel the
interventionist demands by the global civil society, instead of bringing juridification to
a halt. Legal avoidance transforms the interventionist logic of juridification into a par-
ticular type of (new) regulatory rules. In later sections we highlight several of such strat-
egies of legal avoidance by DFIs. But before that, the next section explains how at the
systemic level, social dynamics among DFIs create favourable conditions for juridifica-
tion and for legal avoidance to take place.
The marketplace of international development finance
In this section we again borrow from Polanyi’s account, to show how the system of inter-
national development finance functions as a “marketplace” that features various “market
patterns” (Polanyi 1957, 59–70). The policy jargon of international development finance
is fraught with market-focused discourses, which indicates the presence of this market-
place. For instance, DFIs must be fit for purpose (Hybsier 2015) and adjust their oper-
ations according to the demand of clients (Gulrajani 2016). Value for money is an
important factor that donors take into account when they offer funding to development
institutions (Bailey and Pongracz 2015). Development institutions are also considered to
be effective if they demonstrate their comparative advantage to other institutions with
respect to a specific development area or a project (Streck 2001, 85).
While discourses in policy do not create actual markets, as understood by classical
economics, they are still revealing of the way in which institutions and actors understand
their social realm to work. In this sense, international development finance resembles a
“marketplace” with its peculiar social dynamics. We find the distinction between
“market” and “marketplace” (Dale 2010, 17) in Polanyi’s criticism of orthodox econom-
ists to be crucial here: in primitive forms “[a] market is a meeting place for the purpose of
barter [exchange] or buying and selling” (Polanyi 1957, 59, emphasis added). Actors in
this place do not necessarily act on a price-based equilibrium between demand and offer,
but according to the particular social context. The “marketplace” of international devel-
opment finance can be understood as a fictional space and as a metaphor, which encom-
passes and describes the social dynamics among development finance actors. We offer
the following outline of the participants and dynamics in the “marketplace” of inter-
national development finance.
Donor and borrowing states “meet” in this imaginary space to implement their
respective development strategies as means of exchange. There are also other actors in
the marketplace: for instance, private sector entities participate in co-financing, form
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public-private partnerships or, at times, own or run specific projects. Local authorities
and municipalities also engage with DFIs and their agencies to reshape their geographies
in alignment with international development blueprints (Eslava 2015). All these actors
must select certain DFIs to source or channel finance, but also to oversee the implemen-
tation of related projects and programmes.
In their role as financial and political intermediaries, DFIs participate in this market-
place and in the generation of development outputs (typically development projects or
programmes). Here a “market pattern” (Polanyi 1957, 60) emerges in that the bundle
of international law obligations, soft-law principles and the ES policies of DFIs,
narrow the possibilities for these institutions to generate viable development outputs,
because of the need to comply with all the set aims, requirements and procedures, in
alignment with the broader strategies of development set by donor and recipient
countries. Therefore, a fictitious scarcity of development projects is generated, in a
similar vein in which Polanyi (1957, 75–76) identified the transformation of labour,
land and money as fictitious commodities in society. It is on this relative scarcity that
the competition among DFIs is created.
Rather than pursuing profit as a typical financial intermediary in a market, the invol-
vement of DFIs in the marketplace is aimed at increased legitimacy, leading to insti-
tutional expansion and rising prominence. This is attained by appealing more to
donors, borrowers or private investors in the processes of exchange vis-à-vis other com-
peting institutions, which could also mobilise the same financial resources for similar
development outputs in the same geographical areas. Therefore, DFIs have to please
their donors and the general public, because the former provide them with the baseline
funds for institutional survival, while the latter fuels (but can also undermine) the trust of
actors in financial markets.
This image of development finance as a “marketplace” departs from the more estab-
lished ways of understanding donor proliferation that, for instance, is outlined by Stein-
wand (2015). Rather than focusing on development finance within recipient states, we see
DFIs and other actors interacting with each other at a systemic level. If a DFI is unable to
appeal to the main actors of the marketplace, its development strategy and programming
will not be “selected” for generating a specific development output. Conversely, when the
institution displays all state-of-the art features to perform its functions, it will show that it
is “fit for purpose” by having a “comparative advantage” against the other institutions.
This understanding of the social context of DFIs, struggling for the attainment of a par-
tially scarce development output in the marketplace, reveals another role for ES standards
and accountability mechanisms: they are necessary tools for each DFI to position itself
advantageously and be successful in the marketplace in sourcing more financial resources
from donors and financial markets, regardless of the underlying principles and goals that
these policies seek to attain.
Thus, juridification can be financially beneficial to DFIs. Internal ES policies and
accountability mechanisms are perceived by financial markets, rating agencies and
private investors as risk mitigation measures, intended to ensure the sustainability and
financial return of development projects. DFIs that lack such policies and mechanisms
are mostly bilateral agencies which find financial backing from states of origin, and gov-
ernments which are not yet sensitive to the inclusion of ES standards in their aid activi-
ties.10 However, for DFIs that need to borrow from financial markets, juridification may
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facilitate the lowering of interest rates of financial products offered, thus giving those
DFIs a comparative advantage over less regulated DFIs vis-à-vis other financial
sources and intermediaries (Humphrey 2015).
It is risky for DFIs to adopt rules that challenge, or radically alter the existing patterns
of behaviour in the marketplace. This could compromise their reputation as being too
partisan, unpredictable and thus unfit for future partnerships. DFIs, therefore, observe
one another and refer to each other’s rules, practices and interpretations of existing inter-
national legal obligations whenever a new impetus for further juridification is sent from
global civil society. A clear example here is the open recognition of similarities between
ES policies, via explicit cross-referencing (e.g. “common approach” by the World Bank
2017: para 9; also, AIIB 2016: para 10).
Global civil society also populates the marketplace, by claiming to represent groups
affected by development projects. This relationship is important to civil society organis-
ations, because affected groups are often entitled to participate in consultations during
project deliberation, and to benefit from DFIs’ ES policies and accountability mechan-
isms. Nonetheless, affected people tend to remain only at the margin of the marketplace,
since their access to ES mechanisms often depends on their relationship with the global
civil society – usually due to limited expertise or financial, linguistic, cultural and other
social barriers (Cerrato and Ferrando 2020). Global civil society, on the other hand, can
enter into exchanges in the marketplace (usually with concerned donors), predominantly
based on their claim to know and represent affected people.
Indeed, it is generally accepted in the marketplace that DFIs need to decide on their
development approach by listening to affected people and conducting consultations “in
the field”, in order to be seen as providing realistic development outputs. Nonetheless,
DFIs must also be careful to retain a sense of autonomy and respect for their mandate,
and to never forget that their key partners and funders are in the marketplace, rather
than “in the field”. Hence, on one hand, a friendly attitude towards civil society, and
especially an ability to show that their quest for more rules had been satisfied, is an
asset for the institution. On the other hand, if engagement with civil society is not carefully
managed, it can readily become an obstacle to realising development outputs. Thus, the
adoption of new rules and standards pushed by global civil society is welcome to the
extent that it fits within the confined ideological boundaries of the marketplace.
As a metaphor, marketplace enables us to contextualise juridification better than other
theories currently engaging with similar problems of institutional complexity (Krasner
1982; Gehring and Faude 2014). It is able to explain how and why the links amongst
various distant and seemingly unrelated institutions are maintained and developed. It
also shows that all the actors participating in exchanges in the marketplace share narra-
tives and patterns of behaviour (some visible and some hidden). This set up, we argue,
creates fertile ground for practices of legal avoidance to occur.
What’s the tragedy? Legal avoidance in practice
Strategies of legal avoidance by the DFIs
While the phenomenon of legal avoidance is well-known in the field of tax law, we claim
that instances of legal avoidance are also evident in the creation, application and
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enforcement of ES policies. For instance, one tactic of legal avoidance is to express com-
mitment to an emerging norm or shared value (e.g. equality, human rights, transparency)
through instruments of weak, vague or uncertain normativity. This allows DFIs and
other actors in the marketplace to show their sympathies to the cause in question,
however to continue with “business as usual”, as the approach of DFIs towards inter-
national human rights law shows. For decades, prolonged debates on the relationship
between human rights obligations and development (Alston and Robinson 2005)
stirred little reaction from the DFIs. The issue resurfaced lately, with civil society organ-
isations demanding recognition of human rights in the recent iteration of the World
Bank’s ES framework (Cabrera and Ebert 2019). In response, the World Bank included
the aspiration to protect human rights in the mission statement of its ES framework, but
not in the substantive provisions (World Bank 2017). Arguably, the adoption of more
normative commitments in this rhetorical manner makes it more difficult for global
civil society to demand the achievement of substantive changes represented by such
commitments.
Another strategy of legal avoidance continuously employed by the DFIs is to use man-
agement tools instead of actionable standards. For instance, environmental groups have
long been pushing the World Bank to introduce a “cap” on greenhouse gasses emissions
generated by its projects. In response, the Bank has agreed to account for its carbon foot-
print, rather than committing to a cap (World Bank 2017, ESS 3, para 16). Here, the strat-
egy of legal avoidance entails channelling environmental demands through DFIs’
procedural commitments, instead of creating substantive standards for DFIs.
Due to the prevalence of this managerial approach, voluminous documentation, meet-
ings and reporting have to be produced for any development project to take place. This,
in turn, justifies the expansion of the bureaucratic machinery, but also demands a greater
capacity, as well as more training needs by global civil society to engage with the system.
This dynamic is beneficial to some civil society organisations, because it continues to
justify their role as representatives of affected groups. Meanwhile, the political spaces
to have a meaningful policy debate about development trajectories appear to be shrinking
and are being replaced by procedural “box ticking” exercises based on the standards of
technical assessment (Jokubauskaite 2019). As a result, people affected by development
interventions and exposed to this kind of exercise, are more likely to lose faith in the
emancipatory potential of dialogue and regulatory solutions. Depending on the
project, such loss of faith might result in peaceful struggles against unjust and exploitative
practices. In other cases, however, it can also lead to violence and social disruption (Joku-
bauskaite 2019).
Accountability mechanisms as means of legal avoidance?
Accountability mechanisms have a powerful function in juridification, because they
transform internal ES policies of DFIs into rules with external effects (Jokubauskaite
2018, 2019). However, depending on the project as well as the stringency of specific
ES policies, accountability mechanisms can also become a means of legal avoidance by
the DFIs. A cursory analysis of the caseload of these mechanisms helps to illustrate
this claim.
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A total of 758 complaints investigated by 11 accountability mechanisms were exam-
ined in 2016 in an independent study (CIEL et al 2016). Eighty-one per cent of all com-
plaints submitted to these accountability mechanisms have never reached the resolution
stage and were “dropped” within the procedural stages of complaint procedures (Table
2). A great proportion of claims were dismissed during the admissibility stage (57.5%),
and 23% were suspended. These data alone do not evidence that DFIs’ accountability
mechanisms lead to practices of legal avoidance, as to verify such a claim empirically
would require extensive qualitative research. Yet, these numbers show that affected
people have to jump through many procedural hoops in order to successfully present
their grievances. This seems to echo the managerial approach discussed in the previous
section, whereby ES policies and mechanisms can guarantee access to a process, but not
to satisfactory standards of protection, or tangible outcomes for the people complaining
about a given development project.
Altogether, the study of accountability mechanisms highlighted above shows that
most of these mechanisms may lead to legal avoidance because of their narrow
mandate to only scrutinise compliance with ES standards of a single development insti-
tution, over a limited period of time, based on a limited set of entitlements (e.g. those
concerning indigenous peoples, which do not cover peasants or rural communities),
and according to specific procedural boundaries.11 Also, they have limited capacity to
follow-up on their decisions, and, thus, limited authority in enforcement – which
impedes the potential of long-term and systemic change in development practices as a
result of these processes of accountability (Jokubauskaite 2019). Similarly, because of
their independence from one another, accountability mechanisms do not formally
affect each other in the interpretation of ES standards and their application. Given the
dynamics of competition in the marketplace of international development finance, this
is an increasingly salient point, because of the capacity of borrowers to switch funders,
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or at least to increase the proportion of co-financing from the less “demanding” funding
sources in terms of accountability standards and mechanisms.
While the study above opens up to the hypothesis that DFIs practice legal avoidance
through their accountability mechanisms, the following section illustrates how avoidance
has actually taken place in a specific context.
Case study on legal avoidance: EBRD-funded hydro power plants in Georgia
The case that we draw upon to buttress the claim that accountability mechanisms have
been used by DFIs as a means of legal avoidance, refers to a chain of complaints under the
EBRD’s accountability mechanism, the PCM. These concerned three hydropower plants
projects in Georgia. The first project, approved by the EBRD in Paravani and co-financed
by the IFC, was subject to a complaint in 2011 by a local NGO. Key concerns involved the
impacts on the river’s ecosystem, the risk of flooding of a nearby village, and the lack of
assessment of alternative options to the project (Green Alternative 2011). In 2014 the
PCM found the EBRD non-compliant with its ES Policy for failing the assessment of
risks on the ecosystem and for not disclosing relevant information to stakeholders.
However, PCM’s recommendations were limited to suggesting regulatory amendments
and staff training to the EBRD, as well as proposing to the EBRD management to put
together a plan of information disclosure (EBRD PCM 2014).
Following this, a new complaint was filed by the same NGO concerning a hydropower
plant project in Dariali, approved by the EBRD in 2014. It denounced the EBRD for using
a similar approach to the Paravani project, with specific concerns about the river flow
regime, and the lack of assessment of alternatives. It also raised concerns about a risk
of landslides, and the running of the project within a national park (Green Alternative
2014). In 2017 the PCM found, again, non-compliance by the EBRD with its ES policy
for not having sufficiently included in its assessment geological risks, including risks of
landslides. The PCM did not consider the previous Paravani case to determine non-com-
pliance, due to a lack of a “formal system of precedent” in the PCM mechanism (EBRD
PCM 2017a, 31).
While no recommendation of institutional reform was made, the PCM invited the
EBRD to include additional factors related to the project in the ES Impact Assessment,
and to disclose information on the river flow. The PCM later closed the complaint on
the basis of on-going training of staff, a new Guidance Note on hydropower projects
(EBRD 2016), and the running of “information meetings” and monitoring activities.
(EBRD PCM 2017b). In reaction to the first report, the complaining NGO disapproved
of the recommendation to conduct “detailed geomorphological monitoring” and criticised
its disclosure as sufficient means to address the risk of mudflow on an affected settlement
(Green Alternative 2017). Lastly, in February 2018, the inhabitants of a village filed a com-
plaint under the PCM about another EBRD-funded hydropower plant project, Shuakhevi
HPP,12 which involved the construction of two dams and diversion tunnels against strong
opposition from local groups and civil society (CEE Bankwatch 2015). The complaint
referred to a number of issues, similar to those raised by the Paravani project (Rabati Settle-
ment of Makhalakidze Village 2018; CEE Bankwatch 2015).13
From the claims outlined above, we discern key techniques of legal avoidance, this
time applied to specific projects, rather than to ES policies generally. Firstly, the PMC
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is reluctant to address repeated inadequate risk assessment approaches used by the
EBRD, based on its determination of the irrelevance of previous complaints for similar
projects, even for interpretative purposes. This legal avoidance technique keeps each
claim isolated, fragmenting resistance efforts amongst different complainants, and
increases the complexity in technical and bureaucratic expertise required to engage
with complaints procedure. This reveals the “darker side” of juridification, which
enables the diffusion of institutional accountability by keeping each instance of breach
of standards in isolation from the other. It also places accountability on the mid-level
staff, rather than on the highest level of decision-making of the EBRD, which continued
approving projects with similar problems in the same country.
The “lessons-learned” approach of the PCM also illustrates legal avoidance. As the cases
show, the outcomes have been regulatory amendments, additional guidelines, more trans-
parency and monitoring during the project, with more substantive “remedial changes” not
considered, such as a suspension or a fundamental re-consideration of the project.
To these unsatisfactory outcomes, the complainant NGO understandably responded
with critiques of the very techniques used, calling for increased independent assessment
and transparency, and for an expanded competence of the PMC to second-guess national
court decisions. But in doing so, it has also embraced the logic of juridification and legal
avoidance, while also being unable to fulfil expectations of remedy from those living in
the affected villages and areas.
This case study reflects the paradoxical, if not tragic, consequences of juridification in
international development finance: as global civil society continues to rely on ES standards
and accountability mechanisms, this not only quells their efforts for resistance under the
law but leads them to call for further juridification of ES standards and mechanisms.
The perspective from “the audience”: is this really a tragedy?
To revisit the main metaphor of this article, a tragic protagonist cannot see potential
negative consequences of her actions due to excessive self-confidence (Christodoulidis
2015). In our role as “audience”, a salient question is whether, rather than a tragedy,
ES frameworks are indeed a “better-than-nothing” solution, offering at least a means
of inclusion into the process of development and, possibly, into the marketplace for
some affected communities. In this final section we explain why the tragedy described
in this article should matter to those interested in a better and fairer governance of devel-
opment finance.
A realist counterpoint to our argument could be that ES policies and accountability
mechanisms are only “soft law”. Therefore, these norms and processes are potentially
less significant than what we portray them to be. However, it is important to remember
that the first policies and mechanisms ever adopted (the World Bank’s “Operational
Manual” and Inspection Panel) were created in the midst of a legitimacy crisis of the
DFIs, reflected in the “50 years is enough” campaign (Kapur et al. 1997). This historical
context indicates that internal juridification is a bearing structure that creates a political
“breathing space” for the DFIs to claim and maintain legitimacy, and to insist on their
authority as “development experts” (Kennedy 2016). Without juridification, DFIs
would be more exposed to the allegations of furthering neoliberal or neo-colonialist
agendas. Thus, they would be less likely to sustain their legitimacy in a political
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climate which increasingly claims to protect democracy, self-determination, the environ-
ment, and human rights.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that, althoughnot being law in a formalistic sense, ESpol-
icies are normative in that they shape expectations, subjectivities and behaviour of actors in
international development finance. These effects of soft law at the international level were
identifiedbyNewmanandPosner (2018). Their analysis of internationalfinancial regulations
shows that although non-binding rules might not induce immediate compliance; they often
have long-term structuring and distributional effects, which reshape the discourse and insti-
tutional terrain inwhich they operate (Newman andPosner 2018, 19–29).Wemake a similar
observation, whenwe highlight the systemic and distributional effects of juridification as they
limit the political space for meaningful deliberation.
As to the idea that ES safeguards and accountability mechanisms are a plausible tool in
the array of resistance strategies, a claim can be made that ES policies invoked under
accountability mechanisms can lead to payments of adequate compensation, or even a
partial re-consideration of the project (Fourie 2009). Moreover, the possibility of enga-
ging in accountability processes can inspire political mobilisation at the local level (Joku-
bauskaite 2019). While we recognise this potential, we nonetheless stress that the current
system channels the already scarce energy and resources from affected groups, which per-
petuates their marginalisation in the marketplace of international development finance.
More specifically, juridification and legal avoidance in development finance leads to
specialisation and bureaucratisation, which require more resources and efforts to
enable mobilisation, as well as detailed knowledge of the ES standards and process.
This not only adds a layer of needed expertise, which prominent NGOs are better posi-
tioned to fulfil rather than the members of the affected groups, but also diverts resources
which could be spent, instead, on a fairer and more inclusive project design.
Moreover, even if “successful” (in terms of passing procedural stages), a complaint
usually only opens a dialogue with the relevant DFI; rather than providing a concrete res-
olution to grievances. However, such dialogue does not need to occur under the legal
framing of the DFIs. Resources and expertise could be channeled towards other means
of engagement, within or outside of law. In fact, there are compelling reasons to
believe that political action in the guise of peaceful demonstrations or even civil disobe-
dience can also induce dialogue (Horowitz 2016), in a similar manner to claims in front
of accountability mechanisms. This is because most, if not all, DFIs are concerned with
protection of their reputation and public trust, which can be seriously damaged by
popular mobilisation. However, direct political action does not come with biases nor
the logic of the marketplace, whereby DFIs can use the very existence of the accountabil-
ity process to legitimize their development intervention.
The call from the audience here is that the dynamics of the marketplace have material
implications for global civil society. NGOs active in this area should either prioritise
alternative means to express bottom-up resistance (e.g. human rights frameworks, judi-
cial review, popular mobilisation), or they should try and deploy the logic of the market-
place strategically, to further enhance the voice of affected groups. For instance, they
could mobilise the competition among the DFIs to argue for allocation of more public
funds to those DFIs that have subscribed to more substantial human rights protection.
In the context of growing competition among DFIs, such blunt comparisons might
create more opportunities for external scrutiny of the internal logic of the marketplace.
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Conclusion
We have argued that internal juridification of DFIs sustains a “marketplace” of inter-
national development finance, where affected groups are marginalised and DFIs avoid
accountability through tactics of legal avoidance. We have also highlighted the tragic
implication of counter-hegemonic action that calls for more rules and more refined
accountability mechanisms, as spearheaded by the global civil society, arguing that this
dynamic compromises the very qualities of law that affected groups often try to
invoke. Ultimately, the choice to engage with the process of internal juridification of
DFIs is morally and politically loaded, and civil society entities advising local groups
should always carefully consider such engagement, by also acknowledging its broader
repercussions at a systemic level.
Notes
1. International development is not the only area where such an increased use of regulatory
instruments has been observed. This was termed the “legal turn” in global politics; see gen-
erally, Abbott et al. (2000).
2. With the term “development finance institution” (DFI) we refer to institutions established
under any legal system, including international law, which source and channel financial
resources to recipient countries for the realisation of development projects. With a term
“accountability mechanism” we describe the independent bodies and processes within
DFIs, tasked with assessing project compliance with internal ES policies and enabling com-
plaints by affected individuals or groups. The focus in this analysis is mostly on the multi-
lateral DFIs.
3. Though we acknowledge that not all NGOs and grassroot organisations do. In this article we
employ a “thin” understanding of global civil society, by including only NGOs at the
national and transnational level which claim to represent the interests of people affected
by development projects. For a thicker understanding see, for instance, Falk (1998), who
refers to global civil society as “the field of action and thought occupied by individual
and collective citizen initiatives of a voluntary, non-profit character both within states
and transnationally” (100).
4. Christodoulidis (2015) builds his notion of a tragedy on the account by Berthold Brecht.
5. Blichner and Molander (2008), refined the concept of juridification by identifying five
dimensions: (a) constitutive juridification; (b) law’s expansion and differentiation; (c)
conflict resolution through law; (d) increasing judicial power; and (e) legal framing.
While in international development we can ascertain all five dimensions, our focus with
regards to ES standards and accountability mechanisms is on the (b) (c) and (e) types.
6. Teubner here refers to Max Weber’s distinction between formal and material qualities of
modern law.
7. Ferguson (1994) calls development an “anti-politics machine” that reimagines political
issues as having “technical solutions to technical problems”. Arguably, internal juridification
advances this process of depolitisation by empowering experts and transforming questions
of social (in)justice and (re)distribution into the issues of compliance with technical ES
regulations, both domestically and at the level of DFIs.
8. More generally, building on Max Weber’s theory, “law and development” scholars had
argued that governance by rules enable modern capitalism (e.g. Thomas 2006). The side
effect of this increased reliance on abstract rationality of law is the growing power of
bureaucracy. Critical scholars had noted this dynamic manifesting domestically (Thomas
2006); whereas we also see it taking place internationally, at the level of DFIs.
9. The idea of institutional self-empowerment was also proposed by David Kennedy (2005),
who also criticizes the attitude of international humanitarian law and human rights activists
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(akin to our “global civil society”) for insufficient awareness of their power and negative
consequences that follow from their good deeds.
10. For instance, China’s International Development Cooperation Agency currently lacks such
standards (Kitano 2018, 97).
11. This echoes Kennedy’s argument (2016) about expert rule, whereby experts have significant
power and discretion, but tend to justify their (non)involvement based on the selective
interpretation of their limited mandate.
12. Also supported by the ADB and the IFC.
13. At the time of writing the case is undergoing a Compliance Review under the PCM.
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